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I.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act/

specifically Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-7(2) /

provided tor excess

personal injury protection benefits coverage to an insured who
has received such benefits under a separate policy of automobile
insurance/ as long as the insured does not receive duplication of
benefits.
2.

If the answer to issue no. 1 is affirmative/

whether the exclusion contained in respondent Nationwidefs
policy/ which states/ "We will not pay for bodily injury to
anyone arising from any of the following: . . . e.

Occupying or

being hit as a pedestrian by any motor vehicle other than your
auto/ which is covered as required under the Utah Automobile NoFault Insurance Act"/ is valid in view of the fact that the
exclusion is not one of those permitted by Utah Code Ann. §3141-10.
3.

Assuming that U.C.A. § 31-41-7(2) does permit

stacking such as that sought by plaintiff/ and assuming further
that the above-quoted policy exclusion is not permitted by the
Utah Automobile No-Fault Act/ additional issues exist as to
whether the Insurance Commissioner's Regulation 73-1/ Article

5,

1. All references to the Insurance Code/ except where
otherwise indicated/ are to the code prior to its reinactment as
Title 31A. The motor vehicle accident giving rise to appellant's
claim occurred on January 25/ 1986. Title 31A was effective July
1/ 1986. The subject matter formerly covered in Title 31,
Chapter 41 is now covered at U.C.A. §§ 31A-22-306 through 309.

1

Subdivision i, conflicts with § 31-41-7(2) and is therefore in
excess of the administrative authority granted him; and
4.

Whether/ under the facts of this case/ Nationwide's

"Other Insurance" clause bars appellant from recovering benefits
from her own insurer in view of the payment of personal injury
protection medical benefits to her by the insurer of the vehicle
which struck her while she was a pedestrian, or alternatively
whether the "Other Insurance" clause conflicts with U.C.A. §
31-41-10.
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II.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The relevant facts are undisputed and the parties filed
a pleading entitled Stipulated Facts with the trial court (R. 5661).

Briefly, appellant Vickie Crowther has incurred more than

$7/000 in hospital and medical expenses (R. 37) as the result of
injuries sustained when she was struck by an automobile while a
pedestrian.

The automobile which struck her was covered by a

liability insurance policy which provided basic personal injury
protection (PIP) benefits required under the Utah Automobile NoFault Insurance Act.

Mrs. Crowther has been paid the full $2,000

in medical benefits provided by that coverage.

Mrs. Crowther was

also insured under a policy of automobile liability insurance
issued by respondent Nationwide.

Nationwide!s policy also

included the minimum required PIP coverage, and under it Mrs.
Crowther claimed an additional $2,000 in medical expenses.
Nationwide refused to pay, contending that PIP coverage can not
be "stacked" in that manner and further contending that Mrs.
Crowtherfs claim was barred by a specific exclusion in the policy
and by the policy's "other insurance" clause.
Upon Nationwide's failure to pay benefits, Mrs.
Crowther brought suit as authorized by U.C.A. § 31-41-8.
Nationwide answered Mrs. Crowtherfs Complaint and, after
stipulating to the relevant facts, both parties brought crossmotions for summary judgment.

In view of the stipulation as to

the facts, both sides recognized that one of the motions would in
all liklihood be granted and the other denied.
3

The trial court

granted Nationwidefs summary judgment motion and denied Mrs.
Crowther's summary judgment motion (R. 96-97).

Mrs. Crowther

then appealed to this Court (R. 98-99).
The stipulated facts (R. 56-61) are as follows:
1.

Nationwide is an insurer doing business in the

State of Utah and with an office and place of business in Salt
Lake County/ Utah.
2.

On January 25/ 1986/ Vickie Crowther was the

insured under a policy of automobile insurance issued by
Nationwide.
3.

The automobile insurance policy issued by

Nationwide included Endorsement 1594 providing for personal
injury protection coverage.
4.

On January 25/ 1986/ Mrs. Crowther sustained

accidental bodily injury while a pedestrian when struck by a
motor vehicle/ other than her own/ which was covered as required
under the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act.
5.

As a direct and proximate result of the accident

described in the preceding paragraph/ Mrs. Crowther incurred
reasonable and necessary medical expenses in a sum in excess of
$4/000.00.
6.

Mrs. Crowther was paid $2/000 in personal injury

protection medical expense benefits by the insurer of the motor
vehicle which struck her.
7.

Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) was the entire

amount of personal injury protection medical expense benefits
available under the policy describing the automobile which struck
Mrs. Crowther.
4

8.

Mrs. Crowther made demand upon Nationwide for

payment of $2/000 medical expense benefits pursuant to the terms
of the policy under which she was an insured.
9.

Nationwide failed within thirty-five (35) days

after receipt of proof of Mrs. Crowtherfs medical expenses/ or at
all/ to pay personal injury protection medical expense benefits
under the policy issued by it.
10.

Mrs. Crowther does not claim to be entitled to

more than $2/000 in benefits under the policy issued by
Nationwide [but she does claim a right to interest and attorney
fees pursuant to U.C.A. § 31-41-8].
A true and correct copy of the Stipulated Facts (R. 56)
is included in the Addendum to this Opening Brief of Appellant.
A true and correct copy of Nationwide's policyfs Endorsement 1594
(R. 59-61) is attached to the Stipulated Facts.

5

III.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred when it granted respondent
Nationwidefs summary judgment motion and denied appellant Vickie
Crowther's summary judgment motion.

Implicit in the trial

court's ruling and Order (R. 96) is a finding that Mrs. Crowther
was not entitled to collect personal injury protection medical
expense benefits from her own insurance carrier after being paid
$2/000 in PIP medical expense benefits by the insurer of the
vehicle which struck her while she was a pedestrian.
Utah's no-fault automobile insurance scheme/ as it
existed on the date of the accident/ January 25/ 1986/ neither
expressly permitted nor prohibited so-called "stacking" of
benefits.

However, Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-7(2) stated:
"When a person injured is also an insured party under
any other policy/ including those complying with this act/
primary coverage shall be afforded by the policy insuring
the motor vehicle out of the use of which the accident
arose."
Use of the word "primary" in the statute infers the

possible existance of "excess" coverage.

Section 31-41-7(2)

provided for priority of payment.
The policy exclusion relied on by Nationwide is not one
of those exclusions expressly permitted by the Utah Automobile
No-Fault Insurance Act.

The exclusion upon which Nationwide

relied in refusing to make payment states:

"We will not pay for

bodily injury to anyone arising from any of the following: . . .
e.

Occupying or being hit as a pedestrian by any motor vehicle

other than your auto/ which is covered as required under the Utah
6

Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act."

Admittedly/ that exclusion

does address the factual situation in which Mrs, Crowther was
involved.

However, since Mrs. Crowther was a person covered by

the Act (U.C.A. § 31-41-7(1)), she was entitled to coverage from
her own insurer/ subject only to the permissable exclusions set
forth in U.C.A. § 31-41-10.

Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas., Utah,

608 P.2d 242 (1980).
Neither does Nationwidefs "other insurance" policy
clause deprive Mrs. Crowther of coverage.

For all practical

purposes/ that clause is nothing more than another exclusion from
the coverage required to be provided by the Utah Automobile NoFault Insurance Act and is not one of the permissable exclusions
set forth in U.C.A. § 31-41-10.

The reasonable interpretation of

the "other insurance" clause is to prohibit receipt of
duplicative benefits.

Since Mrs. Crowther's medical expenses

were in excess of $4,000 she would not be receiving duplicative
benefits were she to be paid $2,000 in PIP medical benefits from
each of two different insurance carriers.
The Insurance Commissioner's Regulation 73-1, Article
5, Subdivision i, which seeks to set a "maximum amount of minimum
PIP benefits an injured person may receive pursuant to
involvement in a motor vehicle accident" and mandates that "there
shall be no stacking or duplication of such benefits"/ conflicts
with the plain language of U.C.A. § 31-41-7(2), and is therefore
in excess of the administrative authority granted him.

7

Finally/ if Mrs. Crowther is entitled to receive PIP
medical expense benefits from her own insurer, she is also
entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to U.C.A. §
31-41-8.

8

IV.
ARGUMENT
A.
THE UTAH AUTOMOBILE NO-FAULT INSURANCE ACT IMPLICITLY
PROVIDED FOR EXCESS PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION
BENEFITS COVERAGE, AS LONG AS THE INSURED DOES
NOT RECEIVE DUPLICATION OF BENEFITS
The issue to be resolved is whether appellant Vickie
Crowther, who has been paid $2/000 PIP medical expense benefits
by the insurer of the driver who struck her, is entitled to
collect an additional $2,000 from her own insurer in view of the
fact that her medical expenses are well in excess of $4,000.

The

case requires interpretation of the Utah Automobile No-Fault
2
Insurance Act

and a determination as to whether any exclusion or

other coverage-limiting provision of Nationwide's policy validly
permits Nationwide to deny coverage to Mrs. Crowther.

As is

discussed later in this brief, Nationwide's policy does contain
an unambiguous exclusion which, if valid, clearly bars Mrs.
Crowtherfs claim.

She submits that the exclusion is not

permitted by the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act.
2. The Act, as such, was repealed along with the rest of Title
31 when Title 31A was enacted and became effective on July 1,
1986. Appellantfs accident occurred on January 25, 1986 and this
Court's opinion should, therefore, be based on the prior law.
Appellant doubts that reference to the new no-fault statutory
scheme, U.C.A. §§ 31A-22-306 et seq., would change the result.

9

Utah's statutory no-fault scheme neither expressly
3
permits nor prohibits so-called "stacking" of benefits.
However, Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-7(2) stated:
"When a person injured is also an insured party under
any other policy/ including those complying with this act/
primary coverage shall be afforded by the policy insuring
the motor vehicle out of the use of which the accident
arose."
Use of the word "primary" in the statute infers the
possible existance of "excess" coverage.

If the legislature had

not intended that an injured person be allowed to make a claim
under more than one policy/ it would not have used the word
"primary".

The statute would then read/ "When a person injured

is also an insured party under any other policy/ including those
complying with this act/ [] coverage shall be afforded by the
policy insuring the motor vehicle out of the use of which the
accident arose."

By using the word "primary"/ the legislature

provided for priority of payment:

primary coverage is to be

afforded by the policy insuring the motor vehicle out of the use
of which the accident arose, and excess coverage is to be
afforded by "any other policy/ including those complying with
this act".

3. Appellant uses the term "stacking" in a broad sense. She
really seeks to hold Nationwide liable for excess coverage/
primary coverage having been exhausted before she had been
totally indemnified for her medical expenses.

4.

U.C.A. § 31A-22-309(4) contains almost identical language.

10

Reference to the new Insurance Code, Title 31A,
provides further evidence of the legislature's intent to allow an
insured to "stack" personal injury protection benefits/ as long
as to do so does not result in receipt of duplicative benefits.
U.C.A. § 31A-22-305(6) provides that "In no event shall the limit
of liability for uninsured motorist coverage for two or more
motor vehicles be added together, combined, or stacked to
determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured
person for any one accident. . . . "

However, that portion of

Title 31A which discusses "personal injury protection" coverage,
U.C.A. §§ 31A-22-306 et seq., contains no similar prohibition
against combining or stacking personal injury protection
benefits.

Instead, new section 3lA-22-309(4), in almost

identical language to that of section 31-41-7(2), provides for
the same priority of payment that existed at the time Mrs.
Crowther sustained injuries and incurred medical expenses.
In view of the fact that no other state with a
statutory no-fault scheme has precisely the same scheme as was
contained in the Utah Automobile No-Pault Insurance Act,
reference to analagous cases in other jurisdictions has only
limited value.

Nevertheless, in every other no-fault

jurisdiction which has considered whether an insured may combine
coverage where two or more policies are issued by different
insurers, the courts have held that the insured may avail him or

11

herself of excess coverage.

See, e.g.

Wasche v. Milbank Hut.

Ins. Co./ Minn., 268 N.W.2d 913 (1978); Esler v. United Services
Auto. Assoc./ S.C., 255 S.E.2d 676 (1979); Porter v. Utah Home
Fire Ins. Co./ Or., 650 P.2d 130 (1982); and National General
Ins. Co. v. Meeks, Ga., 244 S.E.2d 920 (1978).

In Baron v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Ga., 276 S.E.2d 78 (1981), the injured
person was a passenger in an insured motor vehicle.

Her medical

bills were less than the PIP benefits available under the
driver ! s policy so the Georgia court held that to also allow a
claim under her own auto policy would result in an undeserved
duplication of benefits.

The court did state, however:

"Under our analysis, had the Barons1 claim for
necessary medical expenses arising from the collision
exceeded the $2,500 limit on that coverage available to them
under the [driver's] policy . . . the PIP "no fault"
provisions of their own policy would have been triggered and
they would have been afforded coverage thereunder for the
excess PIP claims up to the limits thereof."
Nevada's no-fault plan is generally similar to the Utah
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act and neither expressly permits
nor prohibits "stacking" of benefits.

Nevertheless, in Travelers

Ins. Co. v. Lopez, Nev., 567 P.2d 471 (1977), the Nevada Supreme
Court held that "stacking" was permissable.

In that case, Lopez

was injured when his automobile collided with that of an

5. The no-fault schemes in some states contain a limiting
statute. One such statute—that contained in the North Dakota
statutory scheme—states: "The maximum amount of basic no-fault
benefits payable . . . resulting from accidental bodily injury to
any one person as the result of any one accident shall not exceed
fifteen thousand dollars . . .." (§26-41-03(2), NDCC). The Utah
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act contained no such limiting
statute.
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uninsured motorist.

His automobile was covered under two

separate policies/ each containing no-fault coverage.

The

court's opinion permitted Lopez to recover benefits under both
policies.

The court found an important public policy

consideration to support its conclusion.

The court pointed out

that Lopez paid premiums on both policies covering the same
vehicle and the insurance company "accepted the payment of
premiums and has/ in effect/ assumed the risk that injury to the
insured may occur." (567 P.2d at 473).
The same public policy consideration exists in the
instant case.

Vickie Crowther paid premiums to Nationwide for/

among other things/ no-fault coverage.

She was entitled to

coverage to the full extent permitted by the Utah Automobile NoFault Insurance Act/ and limited only as permitted by the Act*
Nationwidefs insistence that she must look only to the insurer of
the vehicle which struck her frustrates that policy.
In each case where a court has prohibited "stacking" of
no-fault benefits the decision was grounded on one of three
factual or statutory basis not present in the instant case.
Either (1) an insured tried to make a claim on multiple vehicles
insured under one policy or by a single insurer/ or (2)
"stacking" would have resulted in a recovery in excess of actual
medical bills or in excess of the amount prescribed by a
"limiting" statute [see fn. 5]/ or (3) the statutory scheme
expressly prohibited "stacking".

None of those basis exist for

denial of coverage in the instant case.

Payment by defendant

Nationwide of its PIP medical benefits policy limits will not
13

result in a windfall to its insured because her medical bills
exceed the combined limits of the policy covering the automobile
which struck her and the policy issued by defendant.
B.
THE POLICY EXCLUSION RELIED UPON BY NATIONWIDE IS NOT
ONE OF THOSE EXCLUSIONS PERMITTED BY THE UTAH
AUTOMOBILE NO-FAULT INSURANCE ACT
Endorsement 1594 to the policy issued by Nationwide/
entitled "personal injury protection (Utah)" (R. 59), provides
that Nationwide "will pay benefits for accidental bodily injury
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor
vehicle.

It pays regardless of fault in the accident.

include Medical Expenses . . . .

Benefits

You and your relatives are

covered for bodily injury caused by accident involving the use of
any motor vehicle."
Endorsement 1594 also provides, under the heading
"Coverage Exclusions", "We will not pay for bodily injury to
anyone arising from any of the following: . . . e.

Occupying or

being hit as a pedestrian by any motor vehicle other than your
auto, which is covered as required under the Utah Automobile NoFault Insurance Act."

The exclusion addresses the factual

situation in which plaintiff was involved.

She was "hit as a

pedestrian" by a motor vehicle which was "covered as required"
under the Act.

However, the policy purports to create an

exclusion from PIP coverage which is not permitted by the Act.
Provided an injured person fits within one of the three
categories of persons covered by the Act (U.C.A. § 31-41-7(1)),
the only exclusions from coverage permitted by the Act are those

14

set forth in U.C.A. § 31-41-10.
Utah, 608 P.2d 242 (1980).

Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas.,

None of those exclusions (which are

all also included in Endorsement 1594) are applicable in the
instant case.

Vickie Crowther was a person described in U.C.A. §

31-41-7(1)(a)—she was injured in an accident in this state
involving any motor vehicle—and thus is entitled to coverage
from her insurer, subject only to the permissable exclusions set
forth in U.C.A. § 31-41-10.

In the Osuala case, supra, this

court did not explicitly hold that the exclusions set forth in
Section 31-41-10 were the only permissable exclusions to no-fault
coverage.

This court did not need to make that finding because

it determined that Osuala, an uninsured motorist, was not one of
those persons described in section 31-41-7(1).

When it enacted

Title 31A the legislature, presumably familiar with Osuala,
resolved any doubt.

The old section § 31-41-10 began, "Any

insurer may exclude benefits: . . ."

U.C.A. § 3lA-22-309(2)(a),

covering the same subject matter, begins with the language:

"Any

insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this

6.

U.C.A. § 31-41-10 provides,
"Any insurer may exclude benefits:
(a)(i) For injury sustained by the injured while
occupying another motor vehicle owned by the insured and not
insured under the policy, or
(ii) for an injury sustained by any person while
operating the insured motor vehicle without the express or
implied consent of the insured or while not in lawful possession
of the insured motor vehicle.
(b) To any injured person, if such person's conduct
contributed to his injury under any of the following
circumstances:
(i) Causing injury to himself intentionally? or
(ii) While committing a felony."

15

part may only exclude from this coverage benefits:" and then
lists the same permissable exclusions as were set forth in
Section 31-41-10.

Under the new Insurance Code, as under the old

Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act, the exclusion for
pedestrian insureds is not one permitted by the statutory scheme.
C.
THE NATIONWIDE POLICY "OTHER INSURANCE" CLAUSE
IS NOTHING MORE THAN ANOTHER EXCLUSION NOT
PERMITTED BY THE UTAH AUTOMOBILE NO-FAULT
INSURANCE ACT
Nationwide also contends that its "Other Insurance"
clause, as contained in Endorsement 1594, bars Vickie Crowther f s
claim for additional PIP medical expense benefits.

That clause

(R. 61) states,
OTHER INSURANCE No insured may receive duplicate benefits
under this and any similar insurance.
Similar insurance may apply to an accident involving bodily
injury to you or a relative/ or bodily injury to someone
else involving the use of your auto. If it does, all
benefits payable cannot exceed the highest available under
any one policy. We will pay our proportional share of such
benefits. That share will be our proportion of the total
benefits available."
All bold print in the quoted portion of the Other
Insurance clause is also in bold print on the policy.

The first

paragraph of the Other Insurance clause provides only that no
insured may receive duplicate benefits.

In view of the

stipulated fact that Vickie Crowther has received $2,000 in
benefits and her medical bills exceed $4,000, it is clear that
plaintiff is not going to receive duplicate benefits should she
receive payment from her own insurer, Nationwide.

16

Apart from the prohibition against duplicate benefits/
it is clear that the Other Insurance Clause is nothing more than
an additional exclusion from coverage.

As was the case with the

exclusion from coverage for pedestrian insureds who are injured
by an insured driver, the exclusion from coverage for an insured
who has received benefits from another source is not one of those
exclusions permitted by U.C.A. § 31-41-10.
The intent of the legislature that an insurer who
provides personal injury protection coverage should not be
allowed to exclude coverage by way of an "other insurance" clause
can be discovered by looking to the new Insurance Act, Title 31A.
U.C.A. § 3lA-22-302(1) provides that every motor vehicle
insurance policy shall contain liability coverage (31A-22-302(1)
(a)) and uninsured motorist coverage (31A-22-302(1)(b)). U.C.A.
§ 3lA-22-302(2) provides that "except for motorcycles" every
motor vehicle insurance policy shall contain personal injury
protection coverage.

U.C.A. § 3lA-22-303(2)(a) provides that a

policy of liability coverage may "provide for the prorating of
the insurance under that policy with other valid and collectible
insurance."

However, there is no similar statutory permission

granted to insurers to provide for prorating of personal injury
protection coverage.
The natural inference is that the legislature meant
what it said in Section 31A-22-309, headed "Limitations,
exclusions and conditions to personal injury protection": the
only permissable limitations to coverage are those set forth in
that statute.

As previously discussed, there is no provision in
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section 31A-22-309, or old section 31-41-10/ for an insurer to
limit its exposure to pay PIP beneifits by means of an "other
insurance" clause.
D.
THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER'S REGULATION 73-1, ARTICLE 5,
SUBDIVISION i, CONFLICTS WITH U.C.A. § 31-41-7(2)
AND IS IN EXCESS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
AUTHORITY GRANTED HIM
The Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act provided in
part that the insurance "department is authorized to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the purposes
of this act".

U.C.A. § 31-41-12.

Pursuant to that authorization

the insurance commissioner promulgated Regulation 73-1/ Article
5, subd. if

which states:

"It is the intent of the Act to provide a package of
minimum Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits to each
person injured in a motor vehicle accident occurring in
Utah. The minimum PIP benefits are to be provided by the
insurer of the motor vehicle which the person was occupying
at the time of the accident or by which he was struck as a
pedestrian. The maximum amount of minimum PIP benefits an
injured person may receive pursuant to involvement in a
motor vehicle accident shall be those amounts specified
under Section 31-41-6. There shall be no stacking or
duplication of such benefits."
Appellant submits that the Insurance Commissioner's
prohibition against stacking of PIP benefits was in excess of his
authority and a misconstruction of legislative intent.

The

legislature's specific prohibition against stacking of uninsured
motorist coverages (U.C.A. § 3lA-22-305(6))/ while reinacting the
language of section 31-41-7 at U.C.A. § 3lA-22-309(4), provides
strong support for appellant's claim.
It is well settled that the legislature may not
delegate authority to a regulatory agency to adopt rules or
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regulations which abridge or modify statutorily created rights.
IML Freight/ Inc. v. Ottosen/ Utah, 538 P.2d 296 (1975).

The

quoted portion of Regulation 73-1 purports to create an exclusion
from, or limitation to, PIP coverage which is not permitted by
the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act which, as discussed
above, specifically listed permissable exclusions.

Regulation

73-1 conflicts with U.C.A. § 31-41-7(2) which implicitly
contemplates the existance of "excess" coverage by mandating that
"primary coverage shall be afforded by the policy insuring the
motor vehicle out of the use of which the accident arose."
There is nothing in the No-Fault Act itself which sets
forth "maximum amount of minimum PIP benefits".

If the

Commissioner's regulation were taken at face value it would be
illegal for an insured to bargain for and pay a higher premium
for coverage greater than the minimum coverage which auto *
insurers must offer.
Colorado's no-fault scheme, the "Colorado Auto Accident
Reparations Act" (CRS §§ 10-4-701 et seq.), also provides that
the director may make rules and regulations necessary for the
administration of the Act.

However, in Travelers Indem. Co. v.

Barnes, Colo., 552 P.2d 300 (1976), the Colorado Supreme Court
held as follows:
"Construction of a statute by administrative officials
charged with its enforcement shall be given great deference
by the courts, [citation]. However, administrative
regulations are not absolute rules. They may not conflict
with the design of an Act, and when they do the court has a
duty to invalidate them, [citation]. Furthermore, when an
administrative official misconstrues a statute and issues a
regulation beyond the scope of a statute, it is in excess of
administrative authority granted." (552 P.2d at 303)
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Regulation 73-1/ Article 5/ Subd. i/ is just such a
case of misconstruction of the no-fault scheme which/ if
enforced, would result in an abridgment of the rights of premium
paying insureds to receive all the PIP benefits permitted by the
Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act.

Regulation 73-1 must be

held invalid to the extent it purports to bar plaintiff's claim
for coverage under her own policy.
E.
IF APPELLANT PREVAILS ON THIS APPEAL, SHE IS ABSOLUTELY
ENTITLED TO REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES. THE TRIAL COURTS
ONLY DISCRETION IS AS TO AMOUNT
U.C.A. § 31-41-8/ reenacted in substantially the same
language at U.C.A. § 3lA-22-309(5)/ stated:
"Payment of the benefits provided for in section
31-41-6 shall be made on a monthly basis as expenses are
incurred. Benefits for any period are overdue if not paid
within 35 days after the insurer receives reasonable proof
of the fact and amount of expenses incurred . . . .
In the
event the insurer fails to pay such expenses when due . . .
the person entitled to such benefits may bring an action in
contract to recover these expenses plus the applicable
interest. If the insurer is required by such action to pay
any overdue benefits and interest/ the insurer shall also be
required to pay reasonable attorney's fees to the
claimaint."
U.C.A. § 31-41-8 contemplated that if an insurer
guesses wrong as to whether or not it owes PIP benefits to a
claimant and refuses to pay/ the insurer, and not the claimant/
bears the risk of the wrong guess.

If this court determines that

the trial court erred and Vickie Crowther is entitled to benefits
from Nationwide/ the only way she can recoup 100% of the benefits
to which she was entitled is if she is also awarded her attorney
fees.

That Nationwide has defended Mrs. Crowther's action in

good faith is no reason to require her to recover less than she
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would have had Nationwide not "guessed wrong" as to the ultimate
outcome of the action.
If U.C.A. § 31-41-8 only came into play once an insurer
was ordered by the court to pay benefits, an insurer could always
refuse to pay benefits until ordered by the court to do so/
secure in the knowledge that there is no risk it might later be
required to pay a greater sum than had it payed benefits when
due.
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V.
CONCLUSION
Appellant Vickie Crowther is not trying to recover the
same item of damage twice.

Her medical bills are well in excess

of the combined PIP medical expense limits of the two applicable
policies.

She does/ however/ wish to recover under each policy

containing provision for payment of PIP medcial benefits until as
many of the medical bills incurred are indemnified as policy
limits will permit.

In order to accomplish that goal/ Mrs.

Crowther should be allowed to "stack" the maximum coverages for
PIP medical benefits under each of the two applicable insurance
policies to the extent of actual losses up to the combined policy
limits of both policies.
Based on all of the above/ appellant respectfully
submits that the Order (summary judgment) entered by the District
Court should be reversed and that summary judgment should be
entered in her favor and against respondent Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Company for $2/000 together with interest at \\%

per

month and reasonable attorney fees/ both as permitted by U.C.A.
§ 31-41-8/ and costs of suit.
Appellant further submits that the action should be
remanded to the District Court for determination of the
appropriate amount of attorney fees to be awarded to her.
Dated:

September

/ "I , 1986.

STEVEN H. LYBBERT
Attorney for Appellant
Vickie D. Crowther
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ADDENDUM
SELECTED STATUTES FROM THE UTAH AUTOMOBILE NO-FAULT
INSURANCE ACT (REPEALED, JULY 1, 1986)
Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-7. Personal injuries covered - Primary
coverage - Reduction of benefits.
(1) The coverages described in section 31-41-6 shall be
applicable to:
(a) Personal injuries sustained by the insured when
injured in an accident in this state involving any motor vehicle.
(b) Personal
accidents occurring in
person while occupying
consent of the insured
accident involving the

injuries arising out of automobile
this state sustained by any other natural
the described motor vehicle with the
or while a pedestrian if injured in an
described motor vehicle.

(2) When a person injured is also an insured party under any
other policy, including those complying with this act, primary
coverage shall be afforded by the policy insuring the motor
vehicle out of the use of which the accident arose.
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under section
31-41-6 shall be reduced by:
(a) Any benefits which that person receives or is
entitled to receive as a result of an accident covered in this
act under any workmen's compensation plan or any similar
statutory plan; and
(b) Any amounts which that person receives or is
entitled to receive from the United States or any of its agencies
because of his or her being on active duty in the military
services.
Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-8. Payment of benefits - Time limit Action for overdue benefits and interest.
Payment of the benefits provided for in section 31-41-6
shall be made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred.
Benefits for any period are overdue if not paid within 35 days
after the insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and
amount of expenses incurred during the period. If reasonable
proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the amount
supported by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 35
days after such proof is received by the insurer. Any part or
all of the remainder of the claim that is later supported by
reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid within 35 days after
such proof is received by the insurer. In the event the insurer
fails to pay such expenses when due, the amount of these expenses
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shall bear interest at the rate of 1 1/2% per month after the due
date/ and the person entitled to such benefits may bring an
action in contract to recover these expenses plus the applicable
interest. If the insurer is required by such action to pay any
overdue benefits and interest/ the insurer shall also be required
to pay reasonable attorney's fees to the claimant.
Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-10. Exclusions from coverage.
Any insurer may exclude benefits:
(a)(i) For injury sustained by the injured while
occupying another motor vehicle owned by the insured and not
insured under the policy/ or
(ii) for an injury sustained by any person while
operating the insured motor vehicle without the express or
implied consent of the insured or while not in lawful possession
of the insured motor vehicle.
(b) To any injured person/ if such person's conduct
contributed to his injury under any of the following
circumstances:
(i) Causing injury to himself intentionally; or
(ii) While committing a felony.
B.
SELECTED STATUTES FROM THE INSURANCE CODE,
TITLE 31A UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1986)
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-302.
vehicle insurance policies.

Required components of motor

(1) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies
purchased to satisfy the owner's or operator's security
requirement of § 41-12a-301 shall include:
(a) motor vehicle liability coverage under §§ 31A-22-303
and 31A-22-304; and
(b) uninsured motorist coverage under § 31A-22-305/
unless affirmatively waived under Subsection 31A-22-305(4).
(2) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies/
purchased to satisfy the owner's or operator's security
requirement of § 41-12a-301/ except for motorcycles/ shall also
include personal injury protection under §§ 31A-22306 through
31A-22-309. First party medical coverages may be offered or
included in policies issued to motorcycle owners or operators.
Motorcycle owners and operators are not covered by personal
injury protection coverages in connection with injuries incurred
while operating a motorcycle.
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Utah Code Ann. § 3lA-22-303(1) through (2)(a).
liability coverage.

Motor vehicle

(1) In addition to complying with the requirements of
Chapter 21 and Part II of Chapter 22, a policy of motor vehicle
liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(1) (a) shall:
(a) name the motor vehicle owner or operator in whose
name the policy was purchased/ state that named insured's
address/ the coverage afforded/ the premium charged/ the policy
period/ and the limits of liability;
(b) (i) if it is an owner's policy/ designate by
appropriate reference all the motor vehicles on which coverage is
granted/ insure the person named in the policy/ insure any other
person using any named motor vehicle with the express or implied
permission of the named insured/ and insure any person included
in Subsection (l)(c) against loss from the liability imposed by
law for damages arising out of the ownership/ maintenance/ or use
of these motor vehicles within the United States and Canada/
subject to limits exclusive of interest and costs/ for each motor
vehicle/ in amounts not less than the minimum limits specified
under § 31A-22-304; or
(ii) if it is an operator's policy/ insure the person
named as insured against loss from the liability imposed upon him
by law for damages arising out of the insured's use of any motor
vehicle not owned by him, within the same territorial limits and
with the same limits of liability as in an owner's policy under
Subsection (l)(b)(i); and
(c) insure persons related to the named insured by blood/
marriage/ adoption/ or guardianship who are residents of the
named insured's household/ including those who usually make their
home in the same household but temporarily live elsewhere/ to the
same extent as the named insured.
(2) A policy containing motor vehicle liability coverage
under Subsection 31A-22-302(1)(a) may:
(a) provide for the prorating of the insurance under that
policy with other valid and collectible insurance;
Otah Code Ann. § 3lA-22-305(6).

Uninsured motorist coverage.

(6) In no event shall the limit of liability for uninsured
motorist coverage for two or more motor vehicles be added
together, combined/ or stacked to determine the limit of
insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one
accident. If uninsured motorist coverage is available to an
injured person under more than one insurance policy/ the injured
person shall elect the policy under which he desires to collect
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uninsured motorist benefits. Claimants are not barred against
making subsequent elections if recovery is unavailable under
previous elections.
Utah Code Ann. § 3lA-22-309(1) through (5). Limitations,
exclusions, and conditions to personal injury protection.
(1) No person who has direct benefit coverage under a policy
which includes personal injury protection may maintain a cause of
action for general damages arising out of personal injuries
alleged to have been caused by an automobile accident, except
where the person has sustained one or more of the following:
(a) death;
(b) dismemberment;
(c) permanent disability;
(d) permanent disfigurement; or
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000.
(2)(a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection
coverage under this part may only exclude from this coverage
benefits:
(i) for any injury sustained by the injured while
occupying another motor vehicle owned by the insured and not
insured under the policy;
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while
operating the insured motor vehicle without the express or
implied consent of the insured or while not in lawful possession
of the insured motor vehicle; or
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct
contributed to his injury:
(A) by intentionallly causing injury to himself;
or
(B) while committing a felony.
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the
exclusions which may be contained in other types of coverage.
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under §
31A-22-307 are reduced by:
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is
entitled to receive as a result of an accident covered in this
code under any workers1 compensation or similar statutory plan;
and
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(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled
to receive from the United States or any of its agencies because
he is on active duty in the military service.
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any
other policy/ including those policies complying with this part/
primary coverage is given by the policy insuring the motor
vehicle in use during the accident.
(5) Payment of the benefits provided for in § 31A-22-307
shall be made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred.
Benefits for any period are overdue if they are not paid within
30 days after the insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact
and amount of expenses incurred during the period. If reasonable
proof is not supplied as to the entire claim/ the amount
supported by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 30
days after that proof is received by the insurer. Any part or
all of the remainder of the claim that is later supported by
reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid within 30 days after
the proof is received by the insurer. If the insurer fails to
pay the expenses when due/ these expenses shall bear interest at
the rate of \\% per month after the due date. The person
entitled to the benefits may bring an action in contract to
recover the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the
insurer is requird by the action to pay any overdue benefits and
interest/ the insurer is also required to pay a reasonable
attorney's fee to the claimant.
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RAYMOND M. BERRY
JOHN R. LUND
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
VICKIE D. CROWTHER,
Plaintiff,

STIPULATED FACTS

vs.
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,

Civil No.

C86-2548

Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
Defendant.
Plaintiff, by and through her attorney, Steven H.
Lybbert, and defendant, by and through its attorney, John R.
Lund, stipulate to the following facts.

In doing so, coun-

sel agree that other facts not stipulated to may be relevant
to the issues raised in the pleadings.
STIPULATED FACTS
1.

Defendant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company

(hereinafter referred to as "Nationwide") is an insurer
doing business in the State of Utah and with an office and
place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah.

2.

On January 25, 1986, plaintiff was the insured

under a policy of automobile insurance issued by Nationwide.
3.

The automobile insurance policy issued by

Nationwide included Endorsement 1594 providing for personal
injury protection coverage.

A true and correct copy of

Endorsement 1594 is attached to these Stipulated Facts as
Exhibit

M W

A .
4.

On January 25, 1986, plaintiff sustained acci-

dental bodily injury while a pedestrian when struck by a
motor vehicle, other than her own, which was covered as required under the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act.
5.

As a direct and proximate result of the accident

described in the preceding paragraph, plaintiff has incurred
reasonable and necessary medical expenses in a sum in excess
of $4,000.00.
6.

Plaintiff has been paid $2,000.00 in personal

injury protection medical expense benefits by the insurer of
the motor vehicle which struck her.
7.

Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) is the entire

amount of personal injury protection medical expense benefits
available under the policy describing the automobile which
struck plaintiff.
8.

Plaintiff has made demand upon Nationwide for

payment of $2,000.00 medical expense benefits pursuant to
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the terms of the policy under which she was an insured.
9.

Nationwide has failed within thirty-five

(35) days after receipt of proof of plaintiff's medical
expensesf or at all/ to pay personal injury protection
medical expense benefits under the policy issued by it.
10.

Plaintiff does not claim to be entitled to

more than $2,000.00 in benefits under the policy issued by
Nationwide.
DATED this

day of June, 1986.

Steven H. Lybbert
Attorney for Plaintiff
DATED this

day of June, 1986.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By
John R. Lund
Attorneys for Defendant
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Endorsement 1594

Mm personal injury protection
^

x

(Utah)
Please attach this important addition to your Century II policy.

With i hi., endorsement your Century II auto policy is amended to provide Personal Injury Protection. Coverage is subject to all
tenm and conditions oi your policy, except as changed by thib endorsement.

SECTION I
PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE
Wt will pas benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. It pays
regardless o( fault in the accident. Benefits include Medical Expenses. Work Loss, Funeral Expenses, and Survivors* Loss
benelas.
For purposes of this coverage:
1. the wj.ds "you" and "your" mean the policyholder first named in n e attached Declarations. They do not include that
policyholders spouse.
2 the word "relative" means your spouse, any other person related to you by blood, marriage, and a ward or foster child. A
relative may temporarily be living elsewhere.
3 the wurdi "bodily injury" mean bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death.
4. the \^ui.<> "motor vehicle" mcanany vehicle of a kind that must be rcg; ;ercd with the Divisionof Motor Vehicles of the Utah
State Tax Commission under Title 41-1-19, Utah Code Annotated 1953 A motor vehicle docs not include a motorcycle.
5. the word "insured" means a relative or anyone using your auto with jour permission.
You and your relatives are covered for bodily injury caused by accident involving the use of any motor vehicle.
Other pei^nis arc covered, provided your auto is not a motorcycle, a* I allows:
I While occupying your auto with your consent or the permission of an insured.
2. While occupying any motor vehicle other than your auto, if it is not used to carry persons for a fee. Such motor vehicle must
be operated by you or a relative. Shared-expense car pools will not be considered carrying persons for a fee.
V As a pedestrian if hit by your auto. Anyone occupying a motorcycle is not a pedestrian.
We wiil pay benefits minus any deductible per person, per accident shown in your policy Declarations. Benefits are as follows:
M Ki;IC A l. KXPENSES We will pay reasonable and necessary medical expenses incurred. We will pay them up to $2000 per
person, \)c^ accident. We will pay for the following: medical, surgical, x-i ay, ambulance, hospital, nursing, dental, prosthetic,
and rehabilitation services and any recognized religious healing method. For hospital services, we will pay only up to the
,emi-pnvaie room charge unless more intensive medical care is needed.

(Continued on other kiOc;

I<K l.vy.S.^ Wc Will pay I or i he covered pei*on's loss of income il ho
isn uiuiiir; U.M beginning Ihicc days al'lci the ucadnii. .nuluu uj« i.
k Ui. ..«*•:., .* LYSV) weeks alter the accident we will pay lor income L»s.
*s;.tie, iiiaiday. Ac will pay lor 859c' ol lost gros> income, not t.. v
ii.e L;.* di.ruig the .overed person's lifciiinc.

ana hie to work because oft he bodily injury. We wtli
nc 4..1 works alia thai day If the insured is unable in
regaining the day ailci the accident, and for up lit .V
seed $150 pci week. We will only pay, howevei, l.».

>»iii ai.-.o ^.», iwr-u'! \ices the covered person would have performed :•• his household, but tot the bodily injury. We will pa .
o i l l ' r.i di.>. Wc will pay for expenses incur icd beginning three d.i ^ alter the accident, and lor up to 365 days alter thai
l! u.v lus.ncd is u.uble topciformsuch household^ >cn ices lor the ;. t U days alter tlie accident, we will pay beginning the
aitci ii*e ace,dent, and lor up to the 365 days after that day. Wc u» • pay for expenses incurred only during the person^
imc.
N^iiA;. KXi'ENSKS If the covered pcison dies from the bodily i;:;ary. we will pay for funeral and burial or cremation
cn.scs incurred. We will pay up to $1,000.
ii\'i\ \;U.W/ i.OSS it the covered pcison dies iioiu the buuii) injui

we will p;fy $2,000 to his natural heirs.

)V£fUGE EXCLUSIONS
Wr •..•;:• iio: pay iot bodily injury to anyone arising from any of the following:
a.

The insured's intentional act.

b.

Committing a felony.

c.

(J,.ciaiing your auto without the consent of the insured or \\i.'

d.

Occupying a motor vehicle you own bui do not insure undei i: s endorsement.

not in lawful possession of it.

Occupying or being hit as a pedestrian by any motor vehicle, uii r than your auto, which is covered as required under
the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act.
f.

Using a motor vehicle located as a residence or premises.

g.

Any act of war.

h.

Any hazard of nuclear material.

Wc will nut pay for bodily injury to you or a relative while occupying a motor vehicle owned by a relative and not insured as
juircd under the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act.
Wc will not pay for bodily injury to anyone entitled to benefits under Utah's Workmen's Compensation Law.

ISUfcED PERSONS' DUTIES
u ius-ic;. or someone for him will promptly report any accident tons ... writing. This report will identify injured persons. It
il giw iiiioimaiion about the lime, place, and circumstance., ol the a. cident.
ie iiuu* cu ui someone for him will promptly submit written prool oi v aim to us. This will be under oath if we require. 1 he
ooi will.;! vc all necessary information for us to determine benefits and amounts payable. The insured will submit lo physical
id menial examinations, by physicians we choose, whenever we reasonably request.
the iiiiUicd, his legal representative, or his survivors bring an action against anyone for the bodily injury, a copy ol the
unmoiis or complaint or other process served will be promptly for raided to us.

IMiTS AND CONDITIONS OF PAYMENT
itNKKiTS PAYABLE Insuring more than one person or vehicle ui: Icr your policy does not increase our liability to one
erson in one accident.
Vc will J educe any amount payable by any amount paid, payable, or i \ \ .iredas follows Under any workmen's compensation
r similar plan except Utah's Workmen's Compensation Plan. By ihc United Slates or any of its agencies related to active
jililarv duty.

Similar insurance may apply to an accident invol ng bodily injury to you or a relative, or bodily injun to <.on>% ^nr S
involving the use of your auto. II it docs, all benefit livable cannot exceed the highest available under any on*? poli'.-v u> •-•!
pay our proportional share of such benefits That • hare will be our proportion of the total benefits available
Similar insurance may apply to an accident that doc not involve you, a relative, or use of your auto. If it docs, we v ii! *yt\\ onh
over and above what is available under the other \r mance.

TRUST AGREEMENT
I o the extent of any payment we make for a loss, w .ire entitled to any payment to the insured by anyone legal;/' .; !c fo: :h
bodily injury. The insured will hold in trust for us hi ; ights ot recovery against any such party. He will do w h i t e *«- p- ^r,%r'
secure such rights. He will do nothing to prejudice th ^ All related papers and instruments will be executed and dri'v-re.* ?,, ,;<

SUBROGATION
We have the right of subrogation. This means that Iter paying a loss, we will have the insured's right to sue for , •; v;.c:\t:
recover the amount of our payment from anyone w ;.^ may be liable. The insured will do nothing to prejudice th?.* ">n* fh<
insured will sign all papers and do whatever is nee•••-.••ary to transfer this right to us.

ASSIGNABILITY
No interest in your policv can be transferred wit hoi • our written consent However, if you die, this coverage will *. •. >n i<ve
lor the rest of the policv period lor others who ue: entitled to coverage when you died.

SECTION II
PREMIUM RECOMPUTATION
We have certain rights if there is a judicial finding that any provisions of the Utah Automobile No-Fauit insurance h v i»;ri;;r,
law suits are invalid. We will have the right to recompute the premium for any coverage under this policy. We will al>o h.r. e in
right to void or amend the provisions of this endo; enient

SECTION III
OTHER COVERAGES
We will pay benefits undci an M-:dical Payments •>' cragc provided "by this policy only over and above anv P-r-rna' Inj"'
Protection benefits that are paid or payable t«*r b« ^ilvanjury under Uiis-or aay other policy^ This includes an\ he-uTtts tha
would be payable except lor a deductible pnu.sio
I he limits ot and an\ amount* payable under \ mni
Personal Injury Pioiectn'ii i o\t rage. I his unhide
pro\ision.
I his endorsement apphc* a> stated in the Declara

.1 Motor :SK coverage will be reduced by sums paid or n.i>ai* • imJci aiv
:••• benefit that ^ould have been paid or payable except {o« a HrductiM

r^ attached to jour policy

I he endorsement is issued l>\ the Nationwide Mui .'. Insurance Compain ot Nationwide Mutual I'tre Insurant < ( orr.pnnv
whichever has issued the pohc\ P> which it is atta< •«!

NATIONWIDE */ JTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
NATIONWIDE MU UAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY
Columbus, Ohio

Secretary

President

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the

Yj^k day of September, 1986, I

hand delivered four (4) copies of the foregoing Appellant's
Opening Brief to John R. Lund, Esq., Snow, Christensen &
Martineau, 10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor, Salt Lake City,
Utah.
Steven $. Lybbert
Attorney for Appellant
Vickie D. Crowther

